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NOTES AND COMMENT
COMMON CARRIERS-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AS TO VALUE OF
PROPERTY
The time-honored description of the common carrier's status of
"insurer" I has in modern times been subjected to considerable quali-
fication. One reads that this changed view results from a realization
that the carrier, like the innkeeper, needs no longer be held in the
ancient suspicion of collusion between it and the thief.2 Insofar as
limitation of liability as to value is concerned, it is submitted that the
present evolutionary stage of common carrier liability is the product
of no more than expedient economics.
The most significant modern step has been the enactment of the
Carmack Amendment, which provides:
Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company . . . shall be
liable ... for any loss, damage, or injury to such property ... and no contract,
receipt, rule, regulation or other limitation of any character whatsoever, ...
shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company . . .
provided, however, that the provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual
loss, damage, or injury notwithstanding any limitation of liability . . . shall not
apply . . . to property, except ordinary livestock, received for transportation
concerning which the carrier shall have been or shall be expressly authorized
or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and
maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or
agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in which case such
declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to limit liability and
recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or released . . .3
Thus, the Carmack Amendment restates the common-law rule against
exemption from liability, and provides a uniform method for permit-
ting limitation of liability.4 The statute takes cognizance of the im-
portance of the value of the article in rate construction; the charge
should bear some reasonable relation to the care to be exercised over
1 STORY, BAILMENTS (5th ed. 1851) § 491; HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS (3d ed.
1906) § 152.
2 -.. owing to the improved state of society and the rapidity and com-
parative safety of modern modes of carriage, there is not now the same neces-
sity as formerly existed for holding carriers to the rigorous accountability of
insurers against all losses except those caused by the act of God or of the
public enemy, have induced the courts of many of the states of this country to
relax the vigor of this rule at least insofar as to permit the carrier to qualify
this liability by express contract with his employer." HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS
(3d ed. 1906) § 389; accord, DosM, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (1914) 122.
349 U. S. C. A. §20(11).
4 Erie R. R. Co. v. Stone, 244 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 633 (1917) ; American
Exp. Co. v. United States Horse Shoe Co., 244 U. S. 58, 37 Sup. Ct. 595
(1917); Boston & M. R. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526
(1914); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490, 34 Sup. Ct. 383
(1914) ; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup.
Ct. 397 (1913); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct.
148 (1912).
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the property.5 The schedule of rates must be reasonable and may
not represent an attempt to limit to an arbitrary amount.6 Gross
disproportion between the value of an interstate shipment and the
agreed value in the receipt does not prevent the application of the rule
that a carrier may limit its liability.7 A rate based on the agreed
value must bear a fair relation to an unconditional rate.8 The rea-
sonableness of the released rate is to be determined by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and may not be attacked collaterally in an
action for the value of the goods.9
In Union Pacific R. R. v. Burke,'0 Mr. Justice Clarke wisely
refuted the carrier's contention that a limitation of liability was valid
although the shipper was given no choice of rates. The decision
checked what might well have been an unhealthy development for, if
a carrier may limit liability without offering a lower rate in considera-
tion, it would be a short step, indeed, to the universal limitation of
liability with no special benefit to the public. This would be exeemp-
tion and not true linmitation It has now been clearly settled that a
limitation of liability will be sustained only where a choice of rates
has been extended and the limitation made the basis of the reduced
rate."1 A common carrier is required to obtain by order of the Com-
mission the right to adopt alternative rates based on declared value of
shipments, and'where it does not do so, a shipper suing for the loss of
goods is not restricted to a recovery of the declared value.1 2  The
carrier may not exempt itself from liability for negligence even though
a special consideration was furnished.' 3 When a railroad acts as a
sAdams Express Co. v. Croninger, cited supra note 4.
6In re Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550 (1908).
7 George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278 (1915);
Donlan v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 Cal. 763, 91 Pac. 603 (1907); Zimmer v.
N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 460, 33 N. E. 642 (1893). Contra: South-
ern Express v. Gibbs, 155 Ala. 303, 46 So. 465 (1908).
8 Louisiana Sugar Planter's Ass'n v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 31 I. C. C.
311 (1914), 34 I. C. C. 253 (1915) ; see General Electric Co. v. Aberdeen
R. R. Co., 159 I. C. C. 327 (1929). As lamps do not combine a high suscepti-
bility to damage with a wide range in value, they are not a class of freight for
which released rates would be proper; Armour v. Director General, 183 I. C. C.
669 (1931). Where rates were based on value, declared by the shipper which
were not required by tariffs to be actual values, they, in effect, were attempts
to limit carrier's liability and so void. In Released Rates on Stone in the
Southeast, 93 I. C. C. 90 (1924), it was pointed out that the fact that claims
are frequent in the carriage of a specific article is not per se a valid reason for
the establishment of released rates.
9 Boston & M. R. R. v. Hooker, cited supra note 4.
10255 U. S. 317, 41 Sup. Ct. 283 (1921).
"A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique,
12 F. (2d) 83 (1926), aff'd. 18 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), cert. denied,
274 U. S. 761, 47 Sup. Ct. 770 (1927).
12 Western Assur. Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 143 Minn. 60, 173 N. W. 402
(1919). Contra: Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Harper Broy., 201 Fed. 671(C. C. A. 7th, 1912).13 The Ansaldo San Giorgio I. v. Rheinstron Bros. Co., 297 U. S. 551,
55 Sup. Ct. 217 (1934); New York Central R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357
1944 ]
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private carrier, the rule that a common carrier cannot stipulate for
exemption from liability for negligence is inapplicable.'
4
The Carmack Amendment was aimed at the chaotic conflict
between the state courts regarding carrier liability, and was intended
to provide uniform rules for movements in interstate commerce. This
statute has effected assumption by Congress of complete authority
over the liability of carriers, rendering inoperative state regulations
respecting interstate shipments. 15 But, the Carmack Amendment
does not interfere with a state statute incidentally affecting the rem-
edy, such as a moderate attorney fee in case of recoverable contested
claims.' 6 In Adams v. Croninger,17 the court said, "The congres-
sional action has made an end to this diversity, for the national law
is paramount, and supersedes all state laws as to the rights and lia-
bilities and exemptions created by such transaction."
The carrier may by contract partially exonerate itself and limit
liability, but such agreement must rest on a consideration other than
the mere agreement to transport at the regular rate.'8 A valid limi-
tation will limit the claimant's recovery to the agreed valuation even
though the carrier's employees stole part of the shipment, where the
employees have not acted for the benefit of the carrier.19  Generally,
limitations must be expressly consented to by the shipper; but, where
the carrier has a released rate on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, knowledge of such limitation is presumed. 20 The ship-
per's agent is presumed to have authority to agree to a limitation of
liability.21 Where the consignor's employee had no knowledge of
the true value and the carrier's agent was so informed, the declared
value being $50, the carrier was not liable for actual value.22 In an
interstate shipment, the bill of lading constitutes the contract between
sender and carrier and where the transportation rate is based on the
value, recovery is limited to the declared value, notwithstanding that
(U. S. 1873) ; York Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1865).
14 Santa Fe & P. R. R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Construction Co., 228 U. S.
177, 33 Sup. Ct. 474 (1913); Crane v. Railway Express Agency, 369 Ill. 110,
15 N. E. 866 (1938).
IsAmerican Ry. Exp. v. Levee, 263 U. S. 19, 44 Sup. Ct. 11 (1923);
Boston & M. R. R. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 38 Sup. Ct. 354 (1918) ; Charleston
& W. C. R. R. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597, 35 Sup. Ct. 715
(1915). A statute of South Carolina subjecting the terminal carrier to a
penalty for failure to promptly pay claims for damages to interstate shipments
was held invalid.
16 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 34 Sup. Ct. 790
(1914).
17 See note 4 swpra.
is Hubbard v. Matson Nav. Co., 34 Cal. 475, 93 P. (2d) 846, cert. denied,
310 U. S. 628, 60 Sup. Ct. 975 (1939).
19 Moore v. Dunga, 237 Fed. 780 (1916).
20 Boston & M. R.-R. v. Hooker, cited supra note 4.
21 American Express v. Daniel, 269 U. S. 40, 46 Sup. Ct. 15 (1925).
22 Ibid.
[ VOL. 19
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the shipping document is not signed by the shipper.23  The shipper
having had the benefit of the lower rate, is estopped from asserting
a higher value despite the fact that he did not sign.24  The consignor's
acceptance of the receipt containing provisions limiting liability, makes
these stipulations binding on the consignee even though the consignor
gave no valuation and even though no inquiry as to the valuation
was made by the carrier.25 The Interstate Commerce Commission
has held that where a rate based on a released valuation and an un-
released rate were in effect, and the shipper failed to declare a valua-
tion, having knowledge of such rate, the unreleased rate applied to his
shipment.26  There is sufficient agreement on the shipper's part if he
signs a printed form of shipping contract which states a specific
value.2 7  Where an interstate motor carrier limited liability without
authority of the commission, and without having filed its schedule of
rates varying with the agreed value, the attempt to limit liability was
declared inoperative.28  In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Robinson,29
the carrier made a special contract for an interstate shipment, agreeing
not to limit its liability. The agreement was held invalid because
the carrier's tariffs on file with the commission graduated the rates
according to declared value. The court said, "To maintain the su-
premacy of such oral agreements would defeat the primary purpose
of the Interstate Commerce Act, so often affirmed in the decisions of
this court. These are to require equal treatment of all shippers, the
charging of but one rate to all, and the filing of that one rate as
required by the act." A limitation of liability in a contract made by
the originating carrier inures to the benefit of succeeding lines; 3 0
but, an initial carrier may not limit its liability for loss or damage
occurring on its own line.3l In Barryrnore Clothes v. Goodnut's
N. Y. & Conn. Express Corp.,32 the plaintiff could recover only $50,
because the carrier limited liability to that amount on its receipt and
23 Railway Express Agency v. Stephens, 183 Okla. 615, 83 P. (2d) 858
(1938).24 American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 34 Sup. Ct 206
(1922).25 Huddy v. Railway Express Agency, 181 S. C. 508, 188 S. E. 247 (1936).26 Western Shade Cloth Co. v. Canadian N. Ry. Co., 147 I. C. C. 535
(1928).
27 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 508, 34 Sup. Ct. 380
(1914) ; Hart v. Pennsylvania, cited supra note 13.2 8 American Tobacco Co. v. Whitney, 291 Ky. 281, 163 S. W. (2d) 817
(1942); accord, Thomas v. National Delivery Ass'n, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 171
(1937).29 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173, 34 Sup. Ct. 556
(1914).3 0 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391
(1912).3 1 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Ward, 4 Ala. App. 374, 58 So. 677(1912); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Miles, 9 Ark. 573, 123 S. W. 775 (1909);
see Gamble-Robinson Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 180 Ill. App. 256(1913), aff'd, 262 Ill. 400, 104 N. E. 666 (1914).
32 Not officially reported, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 199 (1941).
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there was no evidence that the limitation was to apply only on inter-
state shipments. In an action against an interstate motor carrier for loss
of shipment, the carrier, although it had obtained from the commis-
sion a released rate order limiting its liability on certain types of
merchandise which determined rates to be assessed, could not rely on
the released rates order, as there was no evidence of compliance with
the terms of the order and of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 as to
filing and posting of the order and tariffs, shipper not being charged
with notice of the released rates. 83 Agreements limiting liability of
common carriers are in derogation of common law and are to be
strictly construed. 84  The carrier's theory of defense where the ship-
per sues for more than the agreed value is estoppel.3 5 In a theatre's
action for special damages sustained through an interstate carrier's
delay in delivering motion picture films, charging negligence and
knowledge on the part of the carrier that the theatre would suffer
loss if the films were not delivered promptly, liability was held lim-
ited to $50 under a stipulation in the shipping receipt.3 6
Where the shipper understates the actual value in order to obtain
the benefit of the lower rate, he may receive the agreed valuation, and
a contention that the shipper may not recover anything on the ground
of misrepresentation will fail.3 7 It is difficult to see any objection to
a shipper's undervaluation where additional valuation results in grad-
uated incremental charges; the shipper should be given the oppor-
tunity to conclude that the assessments are in the nature of "insurance
premiums", not warranted by the risk involved--or, he may decide
to carry his own insurance. There is a distinction between a case
where the lower rate dependent upon the restricted liability of the
carrier is called a released rate, and a case where the value stated is a
part of the description of the article, and is not merely the exercise
of an opinion by the shipper as to which of two or more rates he will
accept. 8 Rates graded according to the actual value need not be
authorized by the Commission."
33 Mickey Finn Clothes v. Yale Transport Corp., 175 Misc. 242, 23 N. Y.
S. (2d) 84 (1940).
34 Reich v. McGill, 119 N. J. L. 358, 196 Atl. 651 (1938) ; Inland Water-
ways Corp. v. Hallevy & Carey, 52 F. (2d) 13 (1931); Hoye v. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co., 191 N. Y. 101, 83 N. E. 586 (1908); Southern R. R. Co. v. Webb,
143 Ala. 304, 39 So. 262 (1905); Russell v. Erie R. R. Co., 70 N. J. L. 808,
59 At. 150 (1904).35 Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 41 Sup. Ct. 283 (1921);
D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N. Y. 420, 114 N. E. 786 (1916).
36 Pastime Amusement Co. v. Southeastern Express Co., 181 S. C. 203,
186 S. E. 283, cert. gran ed, 298 U. S. 653, 56 Sup. Ct. 954, rev'd, 299 U. S. 29,
57 Sup. Ct. 73 (1936). The court held, "The words of the statute are com-
prehensive enough to embrace all damages resulting from any failure to dis-
charge a carrier's duty with respect to any part of the transportation to the
agreed destination."
37 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469, 33 Sup. Ct.
267 (1912).
38 Norcross Bros. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 29 I. C. C. 109 (1914).
39 Cudahy Packing v. Director General, 104 I. C. C. 705 (1925) ; Crown
Overall Co. v. Director General, 100 I. C. C. 471 (1925).
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A shipper will not be permitted to state a lower value and then
in an action for the full value attempt to introduce parol evidence. 40
An agreement that insurance covering an interstate shipment of cig-
arettes should be accepted in lieu of the motor carrier's common-law
liability was held void as violating the Motor Carrier Act.41  Where
a carrier has paid a claim at the agreed value, and the shipper sues on
an insurance policy procured by the carrier for the benefit of both, the
insurance being without tariff authority, the suit is not maintainable, as
it violates provisions against departure from the published rates.4 2
In New York Central v. Goldberg,43 the shipper's agent innocently
misdescribed a consignment of furs as "dry goods" which was rated
lower. The carrier, unable to produce the furs, relied on Adams v.
Croninger. The court, stressing a bill of lading clause stating, "If
upon inspection it is ascertained that the articles shipped are not
described in this bill of lading, the freight charges must be paid on
the articles actually shipped," held that the misdescription merely im-
posed on the shipper an obligation to pay the corrected charges and
did not affect the liability of the carrier for a failure to deliver, there
being no clause limiting liability.
A source of irreconcilable conflict has been the question of dam-
ages recoverable where part of the shipment, transported under re-
leased rates, has been lost or damaged. One line of decisions permits
recovery of the actual loss, not exceeding the released value; 44 an-
other holds that there may be recovery of a proportional amount of
the released value, based on the ratio which the value of the gobds
lost or damaged bore to the value of all goods shipped.4 5 Some of
the decisions under the first rule point out that no ratio is stipulated
in the contract and refuse to read one into it.46  The Supreme Court
has held that the ratio theory should be invoked when the goods are
homogeneous. 47 The text-writers generally prefer the ratio basis of
40 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harriman Bros., cited supra note 4.4 1 Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Ziffrin Truck Lines, 36 F. Supp. 777
(1941); see Hartford Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N. W. 4 (1925).
Where a common carrier required the shipper to insure it against loss, the
contract was held invalid, as the burden of liability for carrier's negligence
was shifted to the shipper.
42 Duplan Silk Co. v. American & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 205 Fed. 724(C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
43250 U. S. 85, 39 Sup. Ct. 402 (1919).
44 Aronstein v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.. 136 Misc. 352, 243 N. Y. Supp.
221 (1930); Cent. of Ga. R. R. Co. v. Broda, 190 Ala. 216, 67 So. 437 (1914);
Visanaka v. Southern Express Co., 92 Sup. Ct. 573, 75 S. E. 962 (1912);
Huguelet v. Warfield, 84 S. C. 87, 65 S. E. 985 (1909).
45 Western Transit Co. v. Leslie & Co., 242 U. S. 448. 37 Sup. Ct. 391(1917) ; Stratton v. C. M. & St. P., 41 S. D. 79, 168 N. W. 757 (1918); Frank
v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 169 App. Div. 69, 154 N. Y. Supp. 701 (1915); United
Lead Co. v. Lehigh R. R. Co., 156 App. Div. 525, 141 N. Y. Supp. 310 (1913).
46 Chenango Textile Corp. v. Willock, 247 App. Div. 638, 288 N. Y. Supp.
270 (1936); Illinois Cent. v. H. E. Wilson Co., 131 Tenn. 699, 176 S. W. 1036
(1915).
47 Western Transit Co. v. Leslie & Co., cited supra note 45.
1944 ]
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measuring damages. 48  The sharply divergent decisions are cogent
evidence of the fact that the contract terms in issue are equivocal. It
is submitted that the courts embracing the ratio theory have lost sight
of the elementary contract rule that where a term admits of two con-
structions it should be resolved against the party drawing the contract.
Surely, if the ratio measure is the more proper, the carriers can em-
body into their bills of lading and released rate orders, clearer and
unambiguous conditions to achieve the desired intent.
In R. H. Macy v. Pennsylvania Transport Co.,4 9 the limitation
was almost identical with that of the Uniform Express Receipt which
states, "In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said prop-
erty, which is dependent upon the value thereof and is based upon an
agreed valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars for any shipment of
100 pounds or less and not exceeding fifty cents per pound, actual
weight, for any shipment in excess of 100 pounds, unless a greater
value is declared at the time of shipment, the shipper agrees that the
company shall not be liable in any event for more than fifty dollars
for any shipment of 100 pounds or less, or for more than fifty cents
per pound, actual weight, for any shipment weighing more than 100
pounds, unless a greater value is declared herein . . ." The declared
valuation was $700, the shipment weighed 642 pounds and the plain-
tiff's action was for $385, actual value of hosiery lost. The carrier,
relying on the ratio theory, contended that recovery was limited to
$70. The court, in holding for the plaintiff, emphasized the fact that
the case of Western Transit Co. v. Leslie & Co. was not binding,
because at the time of the action motor carriers were not within the
scope of the Interstate Commerce Act. Aside from the fact that the
circumstances in the Western Transit Co. case were different, it is
submitted that there should be no need for the court's distinguish-
ment; any espousal of the carrier's argument would have entirely dis-
torted a reasonable reading of the limitation clause. The court could
have adopted the conclusion of Berlinsky v. Barrett 5 0 where it was
held, "The goods in question actually weighed 270 pounds and hence
this consignment comes within the plain language of the instrument
wherein it is provided that the express company, in case of loss of the
goods, shall not pay over 50 cents per pound, actual weight, for any
shipment in excess of 100 pounds."
A careful reading of the Carmack Amendment and the cases
decided thereunder, gives the impression that a carrier in seeking a
released rate order must offer, in consideration for the privilege, a
rate lower than the existing one. Logically, it would seem that hav-
ing procured a released rate order, the carrier should offer to trans-
port a commodity either at full liability under its old rate, or at less
than full liability at a new reduced rate. However, it is possible for
48 DoBE, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (1914) § 133.
49 148 Misc. 129, 266 N. Y. Supp. 194 (1932).
50 Not officially reported, 173 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1919).
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the existing rate structure to be revised upward. This clearly per-
mits the carrier to make use of released rates as a means of escaping
liability for the consequences of its negligence in direct contravention
of the avowed declarations of the Commission in In Re Released
Rates.51 This condition prevails because as an administrative mat-
ter, the subject of limitation of liability under released rates authority
is separate from the subject of the reasonableness per se of the rates
involved. Unless existing rates are held in force by outstanding
orders of the Commission, carriers are free, by filing tariffs with the
Commission in accordance with Section 6 of the Act, to initiate such
changes in the measure of those rates as they consider that they are
prepared to justify.52 Orders granting released rates authority do
not constitute approval of the measure of rates filed pursuant to the
released rate authority.5 3 Such rates, or any changes therein, are
subject, as in the case of any proposed changes in unreleased rates, to
protest and suspension under the provisions of Section 15(7) of the
Act.54 Clearly, this procedure should be amended in order to compel
the carrier to set forth and justify its proposed rates at the very time
that it applies for a released rate order. Also, any subsequent change
of rates should be considered by the Commission before publication
with reference to the previously obtained release rate authority.
ANTHONY J. DImINO.
COST-PLUS-A-PERCENTAGE-OF-COST SYSTEM OF CONTRACTING
During World War I, the Government made extensive use of
the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting as a means of
inducing contractors who lacked production experience to accept or-
ders for manufacturing new types of war material. The results
attained vindicated the use of this system as a means for rapidly
increasing production; however, from a financial viewpoint, the re-
sulting costs were excessive.
Under the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost (hereinafter referred to
as CPPC) contracts, the fee or profit of the contractor is dependent
on the cost of the work; the amount of the fee automatically adjusts
itself to variations in costs resulting from changing conditions and
requirements during performance. Thus, under a CPPC contract
providing for a profit of 7%, if the costs amounted to $100,000, the
-1 See note 6 supra.52 See U. S. C. A. tit. 49.
53 A typical released rate order (No. 1077, dated May 6, 1944) states in
part, "The Commission does not hereby approve the lawfulness, except under
Sections 20(11) and 219 of the Interstate Commerce Act, of any rates which
may be filed under this authority."
54 See U. S. C. A. tit. 49.
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